ABSTRACT
2. MKSU The MKSU is the local hardware interface for klystron control at the SLAC linear accelerator. Replacing another module (the Modulator Klystron Protection Unit) the MKSU provides a complete interface to the new control system of the status of a klystron station. The MKSU is a rack mounted chassis which is located in the fiat rack adjacent to the controlled klystron. The CAMAC interface (the PIOP) may be up to a hundred feet away. The MKSU contains:
1. An open frame chassis containing a power supply, rear panel connectors wired to internal PC edge connectors, and an internal data buss with PC edge connectors. Contains the relay protection logic for "hard" interlock protection. 2 4 . CONTROL SUPPORT -PAD The MKSU system monitors and controls the RF entering the accelerator, allowing operators to record phase information describing the current machine operations, and to set the phase to a previously recorded value. This feature allows speedy recovery from interfering maintenance operations such as a klystron replacement. The monitoring and control are accomplished primarily through:
1. PAD -The phase and amplitude simultaneously measures the magnitude and phase of the RF pulse that each klystron station provides the accelerator. 2. IPA -The Isolator, Phase shifter, and Attenuator is a high power RF controller consisting of: a rotary field continuous phase shifter, a solid state PIN diode attenuator, and an RF voltage detector. The MKSU drives the stepping motor for the phase shifter, and provides a programmed current source for the attenuator. The RF detector supplies both a front panel diagnostic monitor and the MKSU with a video signal, allowing remote monitoring of the drive pulse. 5. PROTECTION The MKSU is the primary klystron protection against any RF or hardware fault. The protection signals have been divided into two catagories: those which either by the virtue of their nature or importance are considered to be a vital component of klystron protection (the "hard" interlocks), and those which are not critical to the protection, and which are not likely to be accidentally generated due to a software "bug" in the control system software (the "soft" interlocks). 
